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The media has been dominated with news stories about people travelling to Syria to demonstrate 
their support for ISIS or the Al-Nusra Front for most of the last year. This problem is not entirely 
novel as nearly 70 years ago Britain and Ireland were similarly fixated with the problem of 
volunteers departing for Spain to fight on both sides in the Civil War. A portrayal of the 
indoctrination of school age children to fight in that war even seeped into popular culture courtesy of 
Muriel Spark’s novel, The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie. The current problem is, in reality far worse, 
given the relative ease of international travel, the reach of social media, the tactics and targets used 
by extremists, the ubiquity of terrorism across the Middle East and North Africa and the fact that the 
UK has already experienced domestic terrorism inspired by international examples.     
 
The government believes that the radicalisation of people in the UK presents a potential significant 
threat to national security and has the capacity to ruin lives (for those who may be drawn to ISIS as 
well as potential victims). The security agencies are exercised by the possibility of people travelling 
to Syria and other countries and returning with the training and inclination to engage in terrorism. 
There are significant powers available that criminalise such conduct and the Counter-Terrorism and 
Security Act 2015 (s 1) provides for the seizure of passports from those intending to leave the UK in 
connection with terrorism and for orders to exclude people (s 2)  from returning to the UK once they 
have left.  
 
Recent cases before the Family Division have demonstrated that the courts are prepared to act where 
young people are at risk of radicalisation and are having their will suborned to encourage them to 
travel to Syria and other countries (see Mr Justice Hayden in a wardship case involving a 17 year old 
girl, unreported but in the Telegraph of 11 June 2015). In the case of girls there is the certainty of 
child sexual exploitation, sexual slavery and forced marriage (already it is reported that two of the 
Bethnal Green Academy schoolgirls who left in February 2015 for Syria have married) – in the case 
of boys, the risk is of death in combat. For both sexes there is the danger implicit in any travel to a 
war zone. 
 
 
Duty on specified authorities 
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The government has recently placed its preventative strategies on a statutory footing. It is felt that 
this work can no longer be left to the police and security services. Increasing responsibility is now 
placed on all parts of the public sector including local authorities, schools, universities, hospitals and 
even nurseries. Section 26 of and Sch 6 to the 2015 Act places a general duty on specified authorities 
to have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism. According to s (2) 
a specified authority is a person or body that is listed in Sch 6. This includes local government, 
police, health services, education, and child care. 
 
The Government has defined extremism in the ‘Prevent’ strategy as: ‘vocal or active opposition to 
fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual 
respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also include in our definition of extremism 
calls for the death of members of our armed forces’ (Prevent Duty Guidance, p 2).The Statutory 
Prevent Duty Guidance came into effect on 1 July 1 2015, see 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/417943/Prevent_Duty
_Guidance_England_Wales.pdf. Part of the duty includes monitoring, and risk assessment. How 
broad the expectations and responsibilities are is apparent from Part 38 of the same: 
 
“38. We expect local authorities to use the existing counter-terrorism local profiles (CTLPs), 
produced for every region by the police, to assess the risk of individuals being drawn into 
terrorism. This includes not just violent extremism but also non-violent extremism, which can 
create an atmosphere conducive to terrorism and can popularise views which terrorists 
exploit”. (Guidance on the CTLPs is available here: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/ 
uploads/attachment_data/file/118203/counterterrorism-local-profiles.pdf). 
 
The 2015 Act also placed the current “Channel” arrangements for supporting people vulnerable to 
being drawn into terrorism on a statutory footing. Section 36 requires that each local authority must 
ensure that a panel of persons is in place for its area with the function of assessing the extent to 
which individuals are vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism.” Broader functions of the Panel 
include the preparation of action plans to reduce the vulnerability of individuals being drawn into 
terrorism and (with consent) arrangements are made to receive support (including by an approved 
independent provider who can address the potential radicalisation). The Channel Statutory Duty 
came into effect on 12 April 2015.   
 
The Prevent Guidance includes a duty on local authorities to undertake assessments of the risk to 
children of being drawn into terrorism [para 67 of the Guidance]. This may turn out to be 
controversial. This has already proved to be the case with regard to the responsibilities of 
Universities where the University and College Union (UCU) for one, at its May 2015 congress, 
voted overwhelmingly in favour of a motion to boycott the implementation of the Prevent initiative 
in higher education on the basis that it would force its members to ‘spy on learners’ and be involved 
in the ‘racist labelling of students’ principally Muslims: lbeit that their lawyers have said such action 
may be illegal (see Times Higher Education, 28 May - 3 June, p 7). 
 
Local authority and children at risk: protection and partnership 
 
Even before the introduction of the statutory guidance some local authorities had taken steps to either 
prevent children from travelling to Syria or obtain the return of the same. Some of these cases have 
now been published and reveal the courts using powers under the inherent jurisdiction – including 
wardship. Once the children have been secured local authorities and the courts are left to decide 
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whether the children are to be the subject of care orders or wardship to protect them from significant 
harm (Children Act 1989 (CA) s 31).    
 
The use of the inherent jurisdiction 
The Children Act 1989 s. 100 (3) limits the use of wardship so, in effect, it is a jurisdiction of last 
resort and any orders made are necessary to protect children from significant harm (s 100(4) (b)). 
Wardship has survived the introduction of the 1989 Act - as was made clear by Nigel Lowe in 
Inherently Disposed to Protect Children (in “Fifty Years in Family Law Essays for Prof Stephen 
Cretney (2012) Cambridge). FPR 2010 PD 12D (updated 10 April 2014) gives specific examples of 
matters where the inherent jurisdiction can be used. This includes ‘undesirable association’ (para 3.1) 
injunctions which are sometimes used in cases where local authorities are seeking to prevent 
extremist connections and CSE and ‘seek and find’ orders (para 1.2).  
 
In some of the cases involving young women an analogy can be drawn with forced marriage, It is 
striking that this too was combatted by the use of the inherent jurisdiction before the passing of the 
Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act 2007. (Re SK (An adult) (Forced marriage: appropriate 
relief) [2004] EWHC 3202; [2005] 2 FCR 459).Wardship has also been approved in cases where 
there has either been conflict between the parties per the judgment of Hedley J  in T v S (Wardship) 
[2012] 1 FLR 230, and as a ‘unique solution for a unique case’ where there was dispute about the 
care of a child in Re K (Children with disabilities: Wardship) [2012] 2 FLR 745. This approach was 
approved – even in circumstances where a child was accommodated (voluntarily) under s 20 CA 
1989 by the Court of Appeal in Re E (Wardship Order: Child in Voluntary Accommodation) [2013] 
2 FLR 63.  
 
In London Borough of Tower Hamlets v M  and ors [2015] EWHC 869 (Fam) FLR, Hayden J used 
the inherent jurisdiction to prevent young people from leaving the country by ordering that their 
passports be confiscated and the young persons concerned be made wards of court for their 
protection. By contrast, in Re M (Children) [2015] EWHC 1433 (Fam), FLR, Munby (P) used 
wardship to obtain the return of children once they had left the country (since the wardship 
jurisdiction extends to UK subjects outside the jurisdiction). In this case four children, were removed 
from the country by their parents. It was thought that the family were traveling to join ISIS. The 
children were made wards of court and international legal cooperation between the jurisdictions 
affected their safe return. 
 
 
One size does not fit all 
 
Those with whom the courts are concerned are actually a disparate group including young men – 
frequently 15 – 17 years of age who are groomed and drawn to fight in Syria and elsewhere, young 
women 15 – 17 years of age who are groomed to support the jihad, and children where it is the 
intention of the whole family to relocate. Most recent evidence of this is the disappearance of the 
Dawood families and the extended three generational Mannan family from Luton, the latter reported  
by ISIS as being ‘safe’(sic) in Syria (see the Guardian of 4 July 2015).The primary destination of 
concern is Syria but there is some evidence of people wanting to go to Iraq and Libya. There is also 
concern about other countries including Yemen and Somalia given the spread of ISIS to North 
Africa, including Tunisia. 
 
The focus of the courts has been on young people because the court has power under the inherent 
jurisdiction to make orders concerning them. The Prevent Duty also extends to adults– albeit local 
authorities have many fewer tools to deal with the problem unless the adults concerned are 
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considered vulnerable.What we know about these people is that sometimes the young people are 
converts/reverts/newly religious, some may have family members who have already fought – and in 
some cases died– in Syria. Whilst media attention has focussed on ISIS, other young people have 
gone to fight for the Al-Nusra Front. From this, it is obvious that to adopt a ‘one size fits all’ 
approach to cases of this sort would be unwise. 
 
 
Rigorous preparation 
In London Borough of Tower Hamlets v M and ors [2015] EWHC 869 (Fam) FLR, Hayden J was 
able to compare and contrast two sets of proceedings heard on successive days which presented a 
stark contrast in how these cases should be prepared. He stressed that it was essential that the fullest 
possible information is placed before the court in an entirely unpartisan way and that such evidence 
should be prepared rigorously documented and put properly before the court. He then distilled a 
number of core principles applicable to such cases (especially when initially brought ex parte): 
 
(1) Lawyers should draft orders sought before coming to court. 
 
2) Thought should be given from the outset as to how quickly an on notice hearing is listed. 
 
(3) The cases require senior and experienced lawyers. 
 
(4) The interests of the child are paramount and wider public policy considerations do not eclipse 
that but provide the wider canvas. The court must have full details of the wider context of the case.  
 
(5) Verbal assurances that police (or any other service) are aware of /support the application are not 
sufficient. There must be hard evidence, capable of scrutiny, before the court.  This may be a sworn 
statement, the attendance of a police officer or a secure telephone or video link. 
 
(6) There will be public scrutiny of the process and accredited press representatives may attend court 
hearings (though they may be asked to withdraw at sensitive stages).  
 
(7) Advance attention should be given to any necessary reporting restrictions which should be 
drafted before coming to court.  
 
(8) When considering reporting restrictions attention should be paid to non-conventional media 
outlets such as social media. 
 
(9) A co-ordinated strategy, an ongoing dialogue and respect between different safeguarding 
agencies are crucial. 
 
He then went on to stress that, ‘[15] All involved must recognise that in this particular process it is 
the interest of the individual child that is paramount.  This cannot be eclipsed by wider 
considerations of counter terrorism policy or operations, but it must be recognised that the decision 
the court is being asked to take can only be arrived at against an informed understanding of that 
wider canvas.  It is essential that the court be provided with that material in appropriate detail.’  
 
The use of child protection procedures, social workers and children’s guardians as well as the family 
justice system in such cases raises profound questions and involves the finest of judgements. Not 
least of the problems is the pressure to bring care proceedings because of the religious or political 
views of the parents as recently advocated by Boris Johnson who has argued that the law should treat 
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radicalisation as a form of child abuse. (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/10671841/).The-
children-taught-at-home-about-murder-and-bombings.html   This is exacerbated by the wide and 
nebulous definition of terrorism used in the 2015 Act. Domestic case law would suggest that this is 
unlikely to find favour. Caution was most clearly articulated by the Supreme Court In re B (A Child) 
(Care Proceedings: Threshold Criteria) [2013] UKSC 33, [2013] 2 FLR 1075 where Lord Wilson of 
Culworth JSC said (para 28): 
 
“[Counsel] seeks to develop Hedley J’s point. He submits that: 
‘many parents are hypochondriacs, many parents are criminals or 
benefit cheats, many parents discriminate against ethnic or sexual 
minorities, many parents support vile political parties or belong to 
unusual or militant religions. All of these follies are visited upon their 
children, who may well adopt or “model” them in their own lives but 
those children could not be removed for those reasons.’ 
I agree with [counsel]’s submission”. 
 
It should not be forgotten that the Prevent strategy also addresses the problem of  right wing 
extremism but in the case of Re A (A Child) EWFC 11, FLR, the President was keen to stress (at para 
[71]) that membership of an extremist group such as the EDL is not, without more, any basis for care 
proceedings.  
 
In future cases it is clear  that a very careful human rights analysis is called for evaluating the 
competing considerations of Art 8 rights to private and family life, Art 9 rights to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion and Art 10 which provides a qualified right to freedom of 
expression. In certain cases these rights may have to be weighed against the right to life provided by 
Art 2 (if, for example, there was considered to be an imminent risk of a child travelling to Syria in 
circumstances in which it was felt that he was likely to join armed combat) and Art 3 rights to be free 
from inhumane and degrading treatment (which most certainly characterizes the predicament of 
young girls caught in the ISIS web of sexual slavery in all its forms).  
 
It is apparent from this that fine judgement is called for. This poses real problems for social workers 
who might be concerned they are they being expected to be watchkeepers and spokespersons for an 
ideological fight against extremism – the definitions of which are imprecise - and which may 
jeopardise their credibility in child protection work. In a recent article, Tony Stanley and Surinder 
Guru (2015) Childhood Radicalisation: An Emerging Practice Issue Practice: Social Work in Action 
(Vol 27) have highlighted the potential dangers posed to social workers if they were to find 
themselves as pawns in an ideologically driven moral panic. They also raise questions about the sort 
of skills required for such work and the necessity for social workers to have regard to their values 
and adopt an appropriately sceptical approach to risk analysis in this area.  
 
Will parents be frozen out?  
 
It is important that when considering the protection of children from extremism this does not mean 
that guiding and overarching principles should be set aside. Prevent [Para 62] itself stresses that it 
should be read with Working Together. The Channel Duty Guidance stresses that participation is 
voluntary and, in the case of children, that means obtaining parental consent [77]. In rare cases where 
it is sought to persevere despite a lack of parental consent then Local Authorities are directed at their 
powers – including s 31. There is also a danger that the very strategies used to combat extremism 
may prove to be counter-productive – especially if used indiscriminately – with parents being further 
alienated, leading to despair and anger. As Stanley and Gurus argue, families who experience 
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surveillance or pressure in the UK may seek to leave the jurisdiction – placing their children at 
greater risk. What is required is discernment and fine judgements – the avoidance of a one size fits 
all strategy, a rigour of approach, proportionality, restraint, and an informed approach, including  the 
respect for human rights and close scrutiny by courts. 
 
See also Susan Edwards, ‘Protecting schoolgirls from terrorism grooming’ published in the current  
[2015] International Family Law 236. 
